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How a Group Goal May Reduce Social
Matching in Group Performance:
Shifts in Standards for Determining 
a Fair Contribution of Effort
ESTHER VAN LEEUWEN





ABSTRACT. The authors investigated whether the presence of a specific group goal
would reduce social matching (i.e., matching one’s own performance to the performance
expected from others) by serving as an alternative standard. As predicted, when there was
no specific goal, the participants matched their own performance to the performance
expected from other group members. When there was a specific group goal, the women
no longer engaged in social matching, although that effect did not emerge among the men.
Instead, the women’s mean personal performance was close to the performance level rep-
resenting an equal share of the group goal. Moreover, the participants’ perceptions of a fair
contribution mediated the performance of the men and the women, both in the presence
and in the absence of a goal.
Key words: fair contribution of effort, group goal, group performance, social matching
IMAGINE that you are working in a department and that a staff member is about
to retire. Some colleagues have initiated a collection among the 20 members of
the department to buy a farewell present. It is not yet clear what the present will
be, because the present will probably depend on the total amount of money col-
lected. Your office mate just donated $5. How much would you contribute? And
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what would your contribution be if you knew that your colleagues were collect-
ing to buy a painting that would cost $80?
Although the foregoing two questions might elicit different answers, the
amount of money that you contributed would likely be guided by what you consid-
ered “fair.” However, what one considers fair depends on the standard used. In the
first situation, the fair contribution might be determined by the amount of money
that you expected other staff members to contribute, whereas in the second situa-
tion, it might be determined by the amount of money needed to buy the present.
Similar situations may arise when the contribution toward a collective prod-
uct is not in money, but in effort. When people are working toward a collective
product, they often strive to deliver a performance that represents a fair contri-
bution in relation to the total group performance (cf. equity theory; Walster,
Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). However, as the foregoing example demonstrates,
different standards may lead to different perceptions of a fair contribution of
effort (Messick, 1995). For instance, a focus on the observation that some group
members are more capable than others may evoke a preference for a contribution
(performance) based on the capacity of individual group members. Similarly, the
knowledge that some group members may benefit more than others from the final
group performance may evoke a preference for an individual performance based
on the extent to which one benefits from the final group performance.
Although group members may often consider equality in contributions to be
the fairest measure, there are clearly many ways to establish equality. That point
was demonstrated in two studies on the allocation of the costs and profits or loss-
es of a collective enterprise (Messick & Schell, 1992; van Dijk, Engelen, van
Leeuwen, Monden, & Sluijter, 1999). Using the “flea market” paradigm (Harris
& Joyce, 1980), the participants in those two studies read a story about five part-
ners who had run a booth at a flea market, each on a different day. The partners
differed in the number of products that they sold and, thus, the amount of money
that they earned while working at the booth. After the last day, there were still
collective expenses to be paid from the receipts of the enterprise. When the
expenses were subtracted from the gross receipts, what remained was either prof-
it or loss. When instructed to allocate the net profit or loss among the five part-
ners, the participants generally expressed a preference for an equal allocation.
However, those researchers (Messick & Schell; van Dijk et al.) found the same
preference for equality when the participants were instructed to allocate the gross
expenses; the result was an unequal distribution of the net profit or loss. The par-
ticipants’ judgments of what constituted a fair distribution thus depended on the
dimension that was most salient at the time.
Previous researchers investigating equity in effort have investigated primar-
ily how expectations of other group members’ performance may affect one’s own
performance. In general, when people strive to deliver a fair share of effort, they
try to match their performance to the performance expected from other group
members—that is, they engage in social matching (Jackson & Harkins, 1985;
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Kerr, 1983; Paulus & Dzindolet, 1993; Robbins, 1995; Shepperd & Wright,
1989; Williams & Karau, 1991). When people expect low effort from other group
members, social matching may lead them to reduce their own effort. As a conse-
quence, the total group performance may be poor. In such a case, striving for
equity in effort results in social loafing, a reduction in effort that stems from the
interdependent nature of group tasks (Comer, 1995; Karau & Williams, 1993;
Kidwell & Bennett, 1993; Latané, Williams, & Harkins, 1979; Shepperd, 1993).
Because people often (a) expect others to expend less effort on collective than on
individual tasks and (b) believe that others generally do not work as hard as they
themselves, attempts to match one’s own performance to that expected from oth-
ers often result in a reduction in one’s own performance.
Although people may often strive toward delivering their fair share to a col-
lective performance, the salience of a specific standard may determine what per-
sonal performance level is actually considered fair. We have proposed that expec-
tations regarding the performance of other group members function as a standard
for determining a fair share of effort. In fact, in discussing the results of their
study on social matching, Jackson and Harkins (1985) suggested that informa-
tion about other group members’ effort functioned as a standard by indicating
how people in general would respond. Thus, group members might have matched
because they were conforming to a standard. According to that line of reasoning,
standards other than group members’ performance may elicit different perfor-
mance levels. Moreover, because matching may result in a reduction of effort,
alternative standards may prove beneficial in the prevention of social loafing.
In the present study, we investigated the extent to which a specific group
goal would serve as an alternative standard for determining an individual group
member’s performance. Without a specific group goal, group members may be
likely to match their performance to the performance expected from other group
members. When members have information that specifies the total performance
desired for the group, their expectations of other group members’ performance
may become less salient. As a result, group members may be less inclined to
match their performance to that of other group members; instead, they may use
the group goal as a standard for determining a fair share of effort and may aim to
deliver a performance that represents an equal share of the group goal. In both
situations, group members strive to produce a fair share of effort. However, the
presence of a specific group goal may shift the frame of reference from other
group members’ efforts to an equal share of the goal. That shift does not mean
that expectations of other group members’ performance have no impact at all on
personal performance in the presence of a specific group goal; rather, the role of
those expectations may be limited. A specific group goal may, thus, divert mem-
bers’ attention from social matching and focus their attention on delivering an
equal share of the final group performance.
We designed the present study to test the prediction that the presence of a
specific group goal reduces social matching because it affects perceptions of
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what constitutes a fair level of performance. To test that proposition, we com-
pared the fairness perceptions and actual performance of group members who
were given a specific group goal with those of group members who were not
given a specific goal. We measured their expectations regarding the performance
of other group members (thus providing an even stronger test of the social-
matching hypothesis).
Hypothesis 1: Group members’ expectations regarding the performance of
other group members is positively related to personal performance on a group task.
More important, however, we also predicted that, without a specific group
goal, there would be a stronger relationship between members’ personal perfor-
mance and the performance expected from other group members; with a specif-
ic group goal, the relationship between members’ personal performance and the
performance expected from other group members would be weaker.
Hypothesis 2: The absence or presence of a group goal moderates the rela-
tionship between members’ expectations for other members’ performance and
their own performance.
Furthermore, we formulated a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Members’ perceptions of a fair contribution to the total group
performance mediates their personal performance in both the presence and
absence of a specific group goal.
In previous studies, men were often more susceptible to social loafing than
women were (see the meta-analysis by Karau & Williams, 1993). In the present
study, therefore, we considered the possibilities (a) that men would be more
inclined than women to reduce their performance through social matching and
(b) that men would be less susceptible to our group goal manipulation (because
of the strong tendency to match performance to the performance expected of oth-
ers). To explore those possibilities, we added gender as a variable to our design.
Method
Participants and Design
The participants were 53 undergraduate students (33 women and 20 men;
mean age = 20 years, SD = 2.79)1 from a large Dutch university, who were paid
10 Dutch guilders (approximately U.S.$4) for participating. We distributed the
men and the women equally across two experimental conditions (specific goal
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1According to a meta-analysis by Karau and Williams (1993), students are slightly more
susceptible to social loafing than are organizational employees, and social loafing
occurs more in the laboratory than in the field. Because the present study focused on the
reduction of social loafing by the introduction of a group goal, undergraduate students
as participants in an experimental setting allowed for the most appropriate test of our
predictions.
vs. no goal). The main dependent variable was individual performance on the
group task. We measured expected performance2 and submitted it to the analyses
as a continuous variable.
Procedure
On arrival in the laboratory, each participant was seated in one of eight sep-
arate cubicles in front of a single computer. We used the computer to give all fur-
ther instructions, to submit questions, and to register the participants’ answers.
Each cubicle contained a pile of envelopes and a pile of blank paper. We instruct-
ed the participants to fill envelopes with sheets of paper for 12 min. The
envelopes were consecutively numbered, so the participants were always aware
of their performance while they were carrying out the task. We chose that partic-
ular task because one may assume that it is not intrinsically motivating and that
performance on that task is not affected by differences in strength or endurance.
We told each participant that he or she was a member of an 8-person group and
that the envelopes filled by all 8 group members would be combined afterwards
to produce the total group performance.3
Half of the participants received a specific performance goal; the other half
did not. The specific goal consisted of 1,200 envelopes to be filled by all the
group members. We introduced the goal as a high, but attainable, target, as
demonstrated by pretesting (N = 36). We made no mention of a reward for attain-
ing the goal.
We confined the participants to their cubicles for the remainder of the exper-
iment, thus eliminating the opportunity for communication or face-to-face inter-
action with other participants. After the 12 min allocated for the task, we instruct-
ed the participants to put the filled envelopes in a box, to close the box, and to
place it on the floor outside the cubicle. The experimenter then unobtrusively
counted the number of filled envelopes for each participant, which constituted
the dependent measure of personal performance. Meanwhile, the participants had
returned to their cubicles to answer a few questions.
We measured expected performance of other group members by asking the
participants how many envelopes they believed the other group members, on
average, had filled. To assess perceptions of a fair contribution, we asked the par-
ticipants to indicate the performance level (number of envelopes filled) that they
considered a fair contribution to the total group performance (a) for themselves
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2We found no main or interaction effects of goal or gender on expected performance (p >
.10 for all effects). Therefore, we regarded goal, gender, and expected performance as
independent from each other.
3Because participants were seated in separate cublicles and did not interact with other
group members, they could be induced to believe that they were members of an 8-person
group even when fewer than 8 persons were present at that particular time.
as well as (b) for other group members.4 Those items were highly correlated (r =
.98), indicating that the participants did not differentiate between themselves and
other group members in their assessment of a fair contribution (e.g., did not judge
a lower contribution as fair for themselves but not for others). Therefore, we
averaged those two items to form a single scale measuring overall perceptions of
a fair contribution. At the end of the experiment, we paid the participants,
thanked them for their participation, and fully debriefed them.
Results
Unless otherwise indicated, we analyzed the data by separate analyses of
variance (ANOVAs; unique sums of squares), with goal, gender, and expected
performance as the independent variables. We submitted expected performance
to the analysis as a continuous variable and built a complete design to test all
main effects, as well as all first- and second-order interactions. Wherever possi-
ble, we have discussed the effects in terms of cell means. When the effect con-
cerned the continuous variable expected performance, we have reported the stan-
dardized regression weights (β). In this respect, we coded no goal as 1 and
specific goal as 2; for gender, we coded women as 1 and men as 2. We further
analyzed significant interactions by testing the hypothesized simple main effects
or the independent variables (cf. Aiken & West, 1991).
Performance
An ANOVA on personal performance (the number of envelopes filled)
revealed several effects (for the main statistics, see Table 1). First, we found a
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4To avoid focusing participants explicitly on delivering a fair contribution to the group
performance, we measured the fairness perceptions after, instead of before, completion of
the task.
TABLE 1
Results of Analysis of Variance for Personal Performance
Source F(1, 45) η2
Goal .09 .00
Gender 3.06 .06
Expected performance 37.22*** .45
Goal × Gender 7.78** .15
Goal × Expected Performance .04 .00
Gender × Expected Performance 2.69 .06
Goal × Gender × Expected Performance 6.01* .12
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Goal × Gender interaction. The women’s mean performance in the goal condi-
tion was higher than their mean performance in the no-goal condition, whereas
there was no difference between conditions for the men (Figure 1). Separate tests
for the simple main effect of goal for the men and the women revealed a signif-
icant difference in performance for the women, F(1, 45) = 4.42, p < .05, η = .09,
but not for the men, F(1, 45) = 3.36, ns.
The analysis also revealed a main effect of expected performance. As pre-
dicted in Hypothesis 1, the positive standardized regression weight (β = .66)
revealed that the participants’ own performance was matched to the performance
expected from other group members: As expectations of other group members’
performance increased, personal performance increased correspondingly. The
Expected Performance × Goal interaction, predicted in Hypothesis 2, was not
significant. Instead, that interaction was moderated by gender, as shown by an
Expected Performance × Goal × Gender interaction (β = 2.10). We further ana-
lyzed that interaction by conducting separate tests for the simple main effect of
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FIGURE 1. Mean performance (number of envelopes filled) of men and







expected performance within each cell of the design. On the one hand, the
women’s expectations of other group members’ performance were significantly
related to their own performance in the absence of a goal (β = 1.81), F(1, 45) =
14.05, p < .001, η2 = .24, but not in the presence of a specific goal (β = .51), F(1,
45) < 1, as predicted in Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, the men’s expectations
of other group members’ performance were strongly related to their own perfor-
mance, both in the absence (β = 1.14), F(1, 45) = 8.27, p < .01, η2 = .16, and in
the presence of a specific goal (β = 2.14), F(1, 45) = 23.05, p < .001, η2 = .34.
According to the results just noted, both the men and the women matched
their performance to the performance expected from other group members in the
absence of a goal, as predicted in Hypothesis 1. In the presence of a specific
group goal, however, social matching emerged only among the men. For the
women, in contrast, expectations of other group members’ performance no
longer significantly influenced their own performance. Although moderated by
gender, the foregoing results provide partial support for Hypothesis 2—that a
group goal reduces social matching in group performance.
Perceptions of a Fair Contribution
We also tested the extent to which perceptions of a fair contribution to the
total group performance were influenced by the goal or by expectations of other
group members’ performance (for the main statistics, see Table 2). That analysis
revealed a significant main effect of goal: When a specific goal was present, the
participants reported fair contributions as higher (M = 143, SD = 23.87) than when
the goal was absent (M = 125, SD = 18.07). However, a Goal × Gender interac-
tion indicated that the goal manipulation influenced the fairness perceptions of the
women but not of the men (see Figure 2). Without a goal, the men and the women
hardly differed in their perceptions of a fair contribution. With a goal, the women
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TABLE 2
Results of Analysis of Variance for Perceptions of a Fair Contribution
Source F(1, 45) η2
Goal 11.98*** .21
Gender .47 .01
Expected performance 69.58*** .61
Goal × Gender 10.41** .19
Goal × Expected Performance 8.55** .16
Gender × Expected Performance 2.69 .06
Goal × Gender × Expected Performance 7.31** .14
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
considered a fair contribution to be higher than did the men.5 According to tests
for the simple main effect of goal, that effect was significant for the women, F(1,
45) = 20.65, p < .001, η2 = .31, but not for the men, F(1, 45) < 1. Thus, the manip-
ulation of goal affected the women’s, but not the men’s, perceptions of a fair con-
tribution of effort.
The analysis also revealed a main effect of expected performance (β = .71),
which was moderated by goal, as shown by the Expected Performance × Goal
interaction (β = –.32). However, the preceding interaction was further moderat-
ed by gender, as shown by the Expected Performance × Goal × Gender interac-
tion (β = .40). We, therefore, focused on the three-way interaction for further
interpretation. According to tests for the simple main effect of expected perfor-
mance within each cell, the women’s expectations of other group members’ per-
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FIGURE 2. Mean perceptions of a fair contribution (number of envelopes) of










5In fact, the mean estimate of men was still significantly different from 150, which could
be considered an equal share of the group goal, t(9) = –2.28, p < .05, whereas the mean
estimate of women did not differ from 150, t(16) < 1, ns.
formance were strongly related to their perceptions of a fair contribution when
the goal was absent (β = 2.59), F(1, 45) = 49.92, p < .001, η2 = .53, but not when
it was present (β = .46), F(1, 45) < 1. In contrast, the men’s expectations of other
group members’ performance determined their perceptions of a fair contribution
in the absence (β = 1.44), F(1, 45) = 22.88, p < .001, η2 = .34, as well as in the
presence of a group goal (β = 1.42), F(1, 45) = 17.55, p < .001, η2 = .28.
In summary, when a specific goal was absent, both the men’s and the
women’s judgments of a fair contribution to the total group performance seemed
to be determined by the performance expected from other group members. When
a group goal was present, however, the women’s judgments seemed to be influ-
enced more strongly by what they considered an equal share of the group goal,
whereas the men’s judgments were still related more strongly to the performance
expected from others.
Performance Mediated by Perceptions of Fairness
Following Baron and Kenny (1986), we conducted a mediation analysis to
test the extent to which perceptions of a fair contribution may underlie personal
performance. Mediation occurs when the following three conditions are met:
First, the independent variable affects the mediator; second, the independent vari-
able affects the dependent variable; and third, when the mediator is included in the
analysis as a covariate, the mediator must be related to the dependent variable, and
the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable must decrease.
With respect to the first condition, the analysis on perceptions of a fair con-
tribution described earlier revealed a significant Expected Performance × Goal ×
Gender interaction. With respect to the second condition, the analysis on perfor-
mance as described previously also revealed a three-way interaction, the pattern
of which was similar to that for the mediator. Thus, the second condition for
mediation was also met. To test the third condition, we submitted perceptions of
a fair contribution as a covariate to an analysis of covariance, with goal, gender,
and expected performance as the independent variables and personal perfor-
mance as the dependent variable. The covariate was significantly related to per-
formance (β = .69), F(1, 45) = 45.79, p < .001. Moreover, with the exception of
a main effect for expected performance—which decreased from η2 = .45 to η2 =
.12 but remained significant, F(1, 44) = 6.22, p < .05—all other effects were no
longer significant, p > .05. Therefore, as predicted in Hypothesis 3, perceptions
of what constitutes a fair contribution mediated personal performance to a large
extent, in both the absence and the presence of a goal.
Discussion
When working with others toward a collective product, group members may
strive to deliver a fair share of effort to the total group performance. In the
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absence of other cues, expectations of other group members’ effort may deter-
mine that fair share. In the present study, we investigated whether the presence
of a specific group goal would reduce the salience of those expectations and
serve as an alternative standard for determining a fair share of effort. As predict-
ed, in the absence of a specific goal, the participants matched their own perfor-
mance to that expected from other group members. However, in the presence of
a specific group goal, the women no longer matched their own performance to
that expected from others, although that effect did not emerge among the men.
Instead, the women delivered a mean performance close to the performance level
that represented an equal share of the group goal. Moreover, the measurement of
perceptions of a fair contribution of effort allowed us to demonstrate that, in both
the presence and the absence of a group goal, group members aimed at deliver-
ing a fair contribution to the group. However, what the participants considered a
fair contribution seemed to depend on the standard used. In the absence of a goal,
both the male and the female group members considered performance based on
the performance of others as a fairer contribution. In the presence of a specific
group goal, in contrast, the women considered a performance representing an
equal share of the goal as a fairer contribution. With a goal, the women’s per-
ceptions of a fair contribution seemed to be determined no longer by their expec-
tations of other group members’ performance but, instead, by the group’s goal.
Why did the introduction of a group goal reduce social matching for the
women but not for the men? Such gender differences are not uncommon in
social-matching research. According to a meta-analysis by Karau and Williams
(1993), the men were often more susceptible to social loafing than the women
were. Surprisingly, however, there was an almost complete absence of explana-
tions for that phenomenon. Data from the present study suggest that the men
were more concerned than the women with maintaining interpersonal equality in
effort. Perhaps the men had a naturally strong focus on ensuring that their own
efforts did not exceed the efforts of other group members. Indeed, in discussing
the gender difference in social loafing, Karau and Williams suggested that, when
working on collective tasks, men may be more attentive than women to strategic
concerns. If so, then even in the presence of a group goal, other group members’
performance may have been more salient than the goal itself. As a result, in both
the absence and in the presence of the goal, matching may have been the domi-
nant strategy for the men in the present study.
We measured, rather than experimentally manipulated, the participants’ ex-
pectations of other group members’ performance. The measurement of expecta-
tions has both a positive and a negative side. Because we measured expectations
of other group members’ performance, we were able to show the occurrence of
social matching even when other group members’ performance was not salient.
If we had manipulated expectations experimentally, their salience might not only
have undermined the demonstration that matching is a default strategy in the
absence of alternative cues but might also have functioned as a demand charac-
van Leeuwen & van Knippenberg 83
teristic. Nevertheless, some caution is in order, because the assessment of expec-
tations may have created the opportunity for group members to justify their own
performance by stating that they expected the same performance level from other
group members. Although the notion of reversed causality cannot be ruled out, it
cannot explain the three-way interaction in which social matching decreased in
the presence of a goal, but only among the women. Thus, an alternative explana-
tion for the matching effect in terms of self-justification is unlikely.
Karau and Williams’s (1993) meta-analysis suggests that, even though social-
loafing effects are stronger in the laboratory than in the field, social-loafing rela-
tionships in the laboratory typically generalize to field settings. Thus, even though
more definite conclusions need replications in the field, one may expect that the
present relationships also occur in nonlaboratory settings. One must consider the
possibility, however, that such relationships are more pronounced in individualis-
tic Western cultures. According to cross-cultural research, people from collectivist
cultures may be less likely than those from more individualistic cultures to loaf on
collective tasks (e.g., Earley, 1989). It is possible that the foregoing observation
was due, in part, to a stronger tendency for social matching in individualistic than
in collectivist cultures, where people may dispositionally focus more on con-
tributing to the group product and less on equality of inputs. That possibility, and
potential limitation to the generalizability of our conclusions, provides an inter-
esting avenue for future research.
Earlier, we stated that social loafing may result from group members’ striv-
ing toward a fair distribution of effort. Indeed, as previous (e.g., Jackson &
Harkins, 1985) as well as the present researchers have shown, group members
often matched their own performance to the performance expected of fellow
group members, even when such matching implied that the total group perfor-
mance would be poor. Although a focus on fairness may be noble, the resulting
decrease in group performance may not be the desired outcome. However, it
appears that the present group members often reduced their own performance,
not because they did not care about the consequences, but because they seemed
to have little alternative in their desire to achieve equity. Therefore, in many sit-
uations, social matching may be the result of a lack of alternative guidelines for
personal behavior.
On the practical side, the suggestion that social matching results from a lack
of alternative guidelines implies that information indicating the fairest perfor-
mance level for an individual group member may be useful in preventing social
loafing. Alternatively, the tendency toward social matching may enhance, rather
than reduce, performance—that is, when one expects high performance of other
group members, the motivation to match one’s own behavior to that of other
group members may result in higher personal performance. Thus, in situations in
which social matching is salient, the suggestion that other group members are
performing well may improve rather than reduce one’s performance; at the very
least, such a suggestion may prevent social loafing.
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Our operationalization of an alternative standard for performance (i.e., other
than the performance expected from others) as an explicit group goal provided
an interesting link with the literature on goal setting as a performance-enhancing
technique (Locke & Latham, 1990). The finding that explicit performance goals
may enhance performance is robust in performance research and has emerged for
groups as well as for individuals (see O’Leary-Kelly, Martocchio, & Frink, 1994,
for a meta-analysis of group goal-setting studies). An implication of the present
findings is that group goal setting may, in part, enhance performance because it
may reduce downward social matching.
Although a specific group goal reduced social matching, we used the goal to
demonstrate the broader suggestion that the mere provision of an alternative stan-
dard alters perceptions of a fair contribution of effort. Future researchers may
investigate the extent to which other cues elicit the same results. Of particular
interest in that respect are the effects of differences in individual capacity or in
the extent to which group members may benefit from the final group perfor-
mance. In addition, future researchers may shift the focus from the effects of
expectations of other group members’ performance on personal performance to
the circumstances in which those expectations play a more or less important role,
given the presence of other cues.
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